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ENSURING THE CONSTITUTION REMAINS
COLOR BLIND VS. TURNING A BLIND EYE TO
JUSTICE: EQUAL PROTECTION AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN UNIVERSITY
ADMISSIONS
Attashin Safari*
I. INTRODUCTION
On university campuses across the country, students come
together to take part in a global exchange of ideas and experiences.
The fusion of diverse perspectives enriches the campus community
and contributes to the learning experience of each student. As students
compete to gain acceptance into universities, many schools experience
an influx in applications.1 The increase in admission applications has
led to lower acceptance rates at many schools.2 Across the nation,
prospective applicants hope that all students start off on a level playing
field in the eyes of the admissions committee—leaving it up to their
achievements and accomplishments to determine their fate. However,
more and more universities are looking beyond grades and scholastic
achievements when aiming to select a diverse student body.3
Yet the notion that an immutable characteristic such as race may
affect university admissions might be perceived as being
counterintuitive to the notion of fairness between all applicants. This
is the sentiment that drove Abigail Fisher (“Fisher”), an applicant
* J.D., cum laude, 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, Order of the Coif; B.A., cum
laude, 2011, University of California at San Diego. Thank you to Professor Kimberly West-Faulcon
for her invaluable guidance, and Professor Laurie Levenson for her support.
1. Lindsey Cook, Is the College Admissions Bubble About to Burst?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Sept. 22, 2014, 9:48 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2014/09/22/is-thecollege-admissions-bubble-about-to-burst(“Met with an influx in applications, selective colleges
have refined the way they look at students.”).
2. Id. (“The increase in students and applications continue to push acceptance rates lower
and lower.”).
3. See Juju Chang, Good Grades, Extracurriculars, May Not Be All Colleges Look For
Anymore, ABC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2016, 11:30 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/good-gradesextracurriculars-colleges-anymore/story?id=36429888.
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denied admission to the University of Texas at Austin (“University”),
to sue the University, alleging that the University’s consideration of
race in its admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution.4
Fisher’s legal team sought to make her a living symbol of the
alleged unfair racial victimization faced by Caucasians in present day
society.5 Fisher’s narrative depicted a young woman who seemingly
did everything right—worked hard in school, attained high grades, and
participated in extracurricular activities,6 but nevertheless was rejected
from a university that denied her admittance due to the color of her
skin.7 However, the Supreme Court upheld the University’s raceconscious admissions policy as constitutional because it was narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest and thus survived strict
scrutiny.8
This Comment will argue that the holding in Fisher II is narrower
than initially perceived, leaving the door open to future challenges.
Part II of this Comment delineates Fisher’s journey up to the Supreme
Court and discusses the reasoning of the Court in holding that the raceconscious admission policy employed by the University is
constitutional. Part III of this Comment examines the ramifications of
Fisher II with regard to affirmative action as applied in university
admissions and the possibility of future challenges to race-conscious
admissions policies.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The University of Texas at Austin’s Admission Policy
The University’s admission policy has shifted over the course of
two decades.9 Prior to 1997, the University considered two factors, “a
4. See Nikole-Hannah Jones, What Abigail Fisher’s Affirmative Action Case Was Really
About, PRO PUBLICA (June 23, 2016, 12:28 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/a-colorblindconstitution-what-abigail-fishers-affirmative-action-case-is-r. (“There were people in my class
with lower grades who weren’t in all the activities I was in, who were being accepted into UT, and
the only other difference between us was the color of our skin . . . I was taught from the time I was
a little girl that any kind of discrimination was wrong. And for an institution of higher learning to
act this way makes no sense to me. What kind of example does it set for others?”).
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. Id. (“But she was cheated, they say, her dream snatched away by a university that closed
its doors to her because she had been born the wrong color: White.”).
8. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214–15 (2016).
9. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013).
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numerical score reflecting an applicant’s test scores and academic
performance in high school” and the race of the applicant.10 During
this time, the consideration of the race of the applicant was a separate
and distinct factor in the University’s admissions policy. However, in
1996 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in
Hopwood v. Texas11 that the consideration of race employed by the
University violated the Equal Protection Clause.12 The Court of
Appeals held that the University’s race-conscious admissions policy
did not serve to further a compelling government interest.13 Following
Hopwood, the University changed its admissions policy and adopted
a new program to comply with the decision.14
The University continued to take into consideration a numerical
score (hereinafter “Academic Index”) that reflected the applicant’s
academic performance in high school as well as the applicant’s various
test scores.15 However, rather than considering race in its admissions
policy, the University instead created a second factor referred to as the
“Personal Achievement Index.”16 The Personal Achievement Index is
a holistic metric of a candidate’s potential contribution to the
University.17 The University uses this metric in conjunction with the
applicant’s Academic Index.18 The Personal Achievement Index
“measures a student’s leadership and work experience, awards,
extracurricular activities, community service, and other special
circumstances that give insight into a student’s background.”19
In 1997, the Texas State Legislature enacted a statute that grants
“automatic admission to any public state college, including the
University, to all students in the top 10% of their class at high schools
in Texas that comply with certain standards”(hereinafter “Top Ten
Percent Law”).20 The enactment of the Top Ten Percent Law affected
the University substantially, as approximately 75% of the incoming
10. Id.
11. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
12. Id. at 962.
13. Id. at 955.
14. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2415.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2415–16. Such circumstances include “growing up in a single-parent home, speaking
a language other than English at home, significant family responsibilities assumed by the applicant,
and the general socioeconomic condition of the student’s family.” Id. at 2416.
20. Id. at 2416; see TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (2009).
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class is comprised of students granted admission through this means
as opposed to the traditional application process.21 Approximately
25% of the incoming freshman class is still subject to the University’s
admissions policy.22
In 2004, the University created a “Proposal to Consider Race and
Ethnicity in Admissions” (“Proposal”).23 “The Proposal concluded
that the University lacked a ‘critical mass’ of minority students and
that to remedy the deficiency it was necessary to give explicit
consideration to race in the undergraduate admissions program.”24
Beginning with applicants in the fall of 2004, the University updated
its admission policy to include an applicant’s race as a component of
the student’s Personal Achievement Index score.25 Although the
University’s application process is explicitly race-conscious, race is
not “assigned an explicit numerical value,” though it is “undisputed
that race is a meaningful factor.”26
After applicants are assigned scores for their Academic Index and
their Personal Achievement Index, applicants are placed on a grid in
which the Personal Achievement Index is the y-axis and the Academic
Index constitutes the x-axis.27 Students with individual scores that fall
above a certain line are admitted.28
B. Procedural History
1. Fisher’s First Journey to the Supreme Court
Fisher’s first journey to the Supreme Court was in 2013, in Fisher
I.29 In 2008, plaintiff Fisher, who is Caucasian, sought admission to
the University’s entering class.30 After being rejected admission to the
University, she sued the University and various University officials,
alleging that the University’s consideration of race in its admissions

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206 (2016).
Id.
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2415.
Id. at 2417.
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policy was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection
Clause.31
The District Court granted summary judgment to the University,
and upheld the University’s admissions plan.32 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed, however, the court did not perform a searching examination
of the admissions policy, but rather held that Fisher could challenge
only whether the University’s use of race as a factor in the admissions
process was made in good faith.33 In addition, the Fifth Circuit gave
substantial deference to the University, both in terms of the
“compelling interest in diversity” and in its conclusion regarding
whether the University’s “specific plan was narrowly tailored to
achieve its stated goal.”34
However, when the case reached the Supreme Court, the
reasoning of the lower courts was not adopted.35 The Court held that
in order for race to be considered in a university’s admissions process,
the admissions policies must survive strict scrutiny.36 The Court noted
that narrow tailoring “requires a reviewing court to verify that it is
‘necessary’ for the university to use race to achieve the educational
benefits of diversity.”37 The Court further concluded that “[t]he
reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable raceneutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of
diversity.”38
In Fisher I, the Supreme Court disagreed with the rationale
employed by the Appellate Court regarding deference to the
University, and overturned the prior decision because the lower courts
did not apply the correct standard of strict scrutiny.39 The Supreme
Court held that the strict scrutiny inquiry employed by the lower courts
was too narrow in its deference to the University’s supposed “good
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2420. The court presumed the University had “acted in good faith” and placed the
burden of rebutting that presumption on Fisher. By doing so, the court considered the narrowtailoring requirement of strict scrutiny with a degree of deference to the University. Id.
34. Id. at 2417.
35. Id. at 2415.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2414; see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978) (holding that,
“in order to justify the use of a suspect classification, [the government] must show that . . . its use
of the classification is necessary” to achieving a compelling government purpose or safeguarding
a compelling government interest).
38. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2414.
39. Id. at 2421.
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faith” in its use of racial classifications.40 The Supreme Court held that
it was the duty of the courts to actually verify that the means the
University chose to attain diversity were necessary to achieve the
benefits of diversity and find that there was no race-neutral alternative
available that would provide the same benefits.41 The Court ruled that
the lower courts did not conduct an examination that was sufficient
under strict scrutiny.42 It remanded and ordered the lower court to
perform a searching examination of the University’s admissions
process to “assess whether the University has offered sufficient
evidence [to] prove that its admissions program is narrowly tailored to
obtain the educational benefits of diversity.”43
In addition, the Supreme Court concluded that strict scrutiny did
not permit a court to simply accept at face value a University’s claim
that its admissions policy used race in a permissible way.44 The Court
held that any reviewing court must give “close analysis to the
evidence” provided by the university of how the use of race in its
admissions policy “works in practice.”45 The Court held that once a
university has “established that its goal of diversity is consistent with
strict scrutiny” there must still be “a further judicial determination that
the admissions process meets strict scrutiny in its implementation.”46
The Court further explained that “[T]he University must prove that the
means chosen by the University to attain diversity are narrowly
tailored to that goal” and specified that, “[o]n this point, the University
receives no deference.”47
Prior to Fisher I, the Supreme Court upheld the use of race as one
of many factors in a higher education admission program that
holistically examined the overall contribution of individual
applicants.48 However, the Supreme Court had also held that an

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2421.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2419–20 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 2420.
48. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that a law school admissions
program that considered race and ethnicity as a factor affecting diversity did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause because such an admissions policy satisfied strict scrutiny. Reasoning that the
admissions policy constituted a narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further the
law school’s compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that stem from diversity).
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admissions policy that awarded points to applicants from certain racial
minorities was unconstitutional.49
2. Fisher’s Second Journey to the Supreme Court
In Fisher II, the Supreme Court held that the University’s raceconscious admissions policy was narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest and thus survived strict scrutiny.50 The Court
looked to precedent that had established educational diversity as a
compelling interest so long as there was a concrete goal that was
neither a “fixed quota” nor a “specified percentage” of a particular
racial group.51 In reaching its conclusion, the Court acknowledged that
“a university may institute a race-conscious admissions program as a
means of obtaining ‘the educational benefits that flow from student
body diversity.’”52
However, the Court noted that “asserting an interest in the
educational benefits of diversity writ large is insufficient.”53 The Court
noted that, “[a] university’s goals cannot be elusory or amorphous—
they must be sufficiently measurable to permit judicial scrutiny of the
policies adopted to reach them.”54 In applying this rule to the
University, the Court reasoned that the University had not merely cited
the general goal of diversity but rather had “articulated concrete and
precise goals” such as “the destruction of stereotypes, the ‘promo[tion
of] cross-racial understanding,’ the preparation of a student body for
‘an increasingly diverse workforce and society,’ and the ‘cultivat[ion
of] a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.’”55 The
court reasoned that such concrete goals “mirror the compelling interest
this Court has approved in prior cases” and concluded that the
compelling government interest prong of strict scrutiny was met.56
The Court further concluded that the University met the narrow
tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny because the University pointed
to empirical data showing that there were no other workable
49. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273–76 (2003) (holding that a university’s policy of
automatically giving twenty points to applicants who were members of an underrepresented
minority solely due to the applicant’s race was not narrowly tailored to achieve diversity).
50. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016).
51. Id. at 2208.
52. Id. at 2210.
53. Id. at 2211.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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alternatives for attaining its diversity goals.57 In concluding that the
University met the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny, the Court
reasoned that empirical data, including a year-long study conducted
by the University, “revealed that its race-neutral policies and programs
did not meet its goals.”58
The Court reasoned that the University’s conclusion that raceneutral admissions policies were ineffective in achieving the
University’s diversity goals was supported by significant statistical
and anecdotal evidence. 59 For example, the Court noted that a
University study revealed that, “in 2002, 52% of undergraduate
classes with at least five students had no African-American students
enrolled in them, and 27% had only one African-American student.”60
The Court reasoned that although a university “must continually
reassess its need for race-conscious review, here that assessment
appears to have been done with care, and a reasonable determination
was made that the University had not yet attained its goals.”61 The
Court ultimately concluded that due to the empirical evidence
indicating lack of diversity, the University had a “reasoned, principled
explanation” for adopting an admissions policy that considers an
applicant’s race as one factor of the applicant’s Personal Achievement
Index score.62
Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, heavily criticizes the majority’s
conclusion.63 In addition to joining Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion,
Justice Thomas wrote separately to reaffirm that “a State’s use of race
in higher education admissions decisions is categorically prohibited
by the Equal Protection Clause” and that “[t]he Constitution abhors
classifications based on race because every time the government
places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the
provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”64
The dissent written by Justice Alito reasons that the University
had not “identified with any degree of specificity the interests that its
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 2212.
Id. at 2211.
Id. at 2212.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2211.
Id. at 2215–17 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2215 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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use of race and ethnicity is supposed to serve,” and thus did not meet
the demanding standard of strict scrutiny.65 The dissent notes that the
University’s primary argument was that “the educational benefits of
diversity” is a specific interest and that the University “need not
identify any metric that would allow a court to determine whether its
plan is needed to serve, or is actually serving, those interests.”66 The
dissent analogizes the majority’s acceptance of the University’s
generic purpose of attaining the “educational benefits of diversity” to
the court giving deference to the University (a practice that was
rejected by the Supreme Court’s holding in Fisher I).67
Justice Alito reasoned that although the University argued it
adopted a race-conscious admissions policy in order to promote
classroom diversity, the University had not shown that its admissions
policy did in fact increase classroom diversity.68 In addition, the
dissent criticized the University for arguing that it lacked a “critical
mass” of minority students without ever defining the term “critical
mass.”69 Justice Alito notes that “[a]ccording to [the University], a
critical mass is neither some absolute number of African-American or
Hispanic students nor the percentage of African-Americans or
Hispanics in the general population of the State.”70 The dissenting
Justices reason that accepting this type of generic and undefined goal
is akin to giving deference to the University.71 The dissent further
notes that to the extent that the University is aiming to diversify their
incoming class to achieve harmony with Texas demographics of
minority populations, such an act constitutes an “outright racial
balancing” that has unequivocally been held as unconstitutional.72
The dissent further reasons that the University’s admission policy
does not meet the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny.73
Justice Alito argues that even if the University is “truly seeking to
expose its students to a diversity of ideas and perspectives,” the race65. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. Id.; Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. (holding that the strict scrutiny inquiry employed by the
Appellate Court was too narrow in its deference to the university’s supposed “good faith” in its use
of racial classifications).
68. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2225.
73. Id. at 2227.
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conscious admissions process is poorly tailored to serve that interest.74
To make that point,75 Justice Alito points to the University’s own
study of Asian-American students, “which the majority touts as the
best ‘nuanced quantitative data’ supporting UT’s position” and notes
that it demonstrated that “classroom diversity was more lacking for
students classified as Asian-American than for those classified as
Hispanic.”76 Justice Alito argued that the University’s plan actually
discriminates against Asian-American students.77 Justice Alito
justified his argument by reasoning that the University’s raceconscious admissions policy is “clearly designed to increase the
number of African-American and Hispanic students by giving them an
admissions boost vis-à-vis other applicants.”78 Justice Alito further
argued that, “[g]iven [the] ‘limited number of spaces,’ providing a
boost to African-Americans and Hispanics inevitably harms students
who do not receive the same boost by decreasing their odds of
admission.”79
Justice Alito also criticized the majority for “completely
ignor[ing] [the University’s] finding that Hispanics are better
represented than Asian-Americans in classrooms” and reasons that the
majority’s holding demonstrates the notion that the University “can
pick and choose which racial and ethnic groups it would like to
favor.”80 The dissenting justices brought their argument full circle in
reasoning that, “unless the University is engaged in unconstitutional
racial balancing based on Texas demographics (where Hispanics
outnumber Asian-Americans), it seemingly views the classroom
contributions of Asian-American students as less valuable than those
of Hispanic students.”81 The dissent ultimately concludes that the
University did not meet either prong of the heavy burden of strict
scrutiny and heavily criticizes the majority’s conclusion, stating that
the holding was “remarkably wrong.”82

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2227 n.4.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 2227–28.
Id. at 2227 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2243.
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III. ANALYSIS
While Justice Alito’s dissent constitutes a passionate plea for
those that believe the majority granted too much deference to the
University in its holding, legal precedent supports the conclusion of
the majority that the University’s race-conscious admissions policy
survives strict scrutiny. The dissent points out that the University
failed to define the term “critical mass” with clarity and reasons that
without knowing specifically how a “critical mass” of minority
students can be measured, a reviewing court would not be able to
examine whether the use of race would be necessary to meet that
goal.83 However, this reasoning is flawed. Well-established case law
prohibits the use of numbers or quotas for minority student admission
in universities.84 In addition, Justice Alito’s argument that the
University’s race-conscious admissions policy provides a “boost to
African-Americans and Hispanics”85 that harms other students by
“decreasing their odds of admission”86 finds no support in legal
precedent regarding the burden of strict scrutiny. Accepting this kind
of reasoning would merely serve to blur the line between arguments
emerging from established legal precedent and passionate rhetoric
aiming to persuade the masses.
However, a careful examination of the holding in Fisher II lends
support to the notion that the Court’s decision leaves the door open for
future challenges. Ultimately, the holding in Fisher II is a far cry from
the unequivocal upholding of “affirmative action” in college
admissions that many national headlines jumped to proclaim.87 Justice
Kennedy examined the University’s race-conscious admissions policy
with a strict application of the narrow tailoring prong and his reasoning

83. Id. at 2222.
84. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (“To be narrowly tailored, a raceconscious admissions program cannot use a quota system.”).
85. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2222 n.4.
86. Id.
87. See Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Upholds Affirmative Action in College Admissions,
NPR (June 23, 2016, 4:31 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/06/23/483275212/supreme-courtupholds-affirmative-action-in-college-admissions; Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Upholds
Affirmative Action in University Admissions, USA TODAY (June 23, 2016, 5:36 PM), http://www.
usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/06/23/supreme-court-university-texas-affirmative-actionrace/83239790; Jess Bravin & Brent Kendall, Supreme Court Upholds Affirmative Action in
University Admissions, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-courtupholds-affirmative-action-in-university-admissions-1466691615.
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was firmly based on records and data.88 A strong argument against the
use of a race-conscious admissions policy as a means of achieving the
various benefits of diversity is that such an outcome can be achieved
by other means. Justice Kennedy reasoned that the narrow tailoring
requirement of strict scrutiny was met because the University used
extensive evidence to show that there were no race-neutral alternatives
available.89 The Court specifically reasoned that a review of the record
revealed that none of Fisher’s “suggested alternatives—nor other
proposals considered or discussed in the course” of litigation
constituted a “‘available’ and ‘workable’” alternative by which the
University could attain its “educational goals.”90
Fisher II ceases to be a one size fits all interpretation of the equal
protection clause as it pertains to the use of race in university
admissions. The Court made it clear that the holding was based on the
specific set of circumstances present in the case, and even noted that
the constitutionality of the University’s admission policy must be
reassessed in the future “in light of the experience the school has
accumulated and the data it has gathered since the adoption of its
admissions plan.”91 The Court noted that the University has a
“continuing obligation to satisfy the burden of strict scrutiny in light
of changing circumstances.”92 With respect to the narrow tailoring
prong of strict scrutiny, the Court pointed to the extensive evidence
the University presented regarding race neutral alternatives.93 The
Court’s imperative use of the type of critical records and data that
would range widely from university to university delineates how fact
specific the narrow tailoring consideration is. Such a fact specific
consideration inherently leaves the door open for future challenges.
This is exemplified by Justice Kennedy’s consideration of
Fisher’s suggestion that one alternative mean by which the University
could attain its diversity goals may be to “intensify its outreach efforts
to African-American and Hispanic applicants.”94 Justice Kennedy
pointed to the fact that the University submitted “extensive evidence
88. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2211–14; See, e.g., 2212 (“The record itself contains significant
evidence, both statistical and anecdotal, in support of the University’s position.”).
89. Id. at 2214.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2209–10.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2212–13.
94. Id.
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of the many ways in which it already had intensified its outreach
efforts to those students.”95 Specifically, the University had submitted
evidence that it had created several new scholarship programs,
“opened new regional admissions centers, increased its recruitment
budget by half-a-million dollars, and organized over 1,000 recruitment
events.”96 Justice Kennedy specifically pointed to the fact that the
University “spent seven years attempting to achieve its compelling
interest using race-neutral holistic review” but “none of these efforts
succeeded.”97 Such university-specific facts and considerations cannot
be stretched to fit across the board to various universities across our
nation. When such specific considerations are employed, even a slight
variation in facts and circumstances at another university may tip the
balance in favor of a ruling that strict scrutiny was not met.98
The Court emphasized that the University’s admissions process
was both unique and complex, and that the set of circumstances
creating the backdrop of Fisher II may limit the case’s value for
“prospective guidance.”99 Fundamentally, Texas’s unique Top Ten
Percent Law played an important role in the diversity of the
University. Approximately 75% of admitted students are comprised of
students granted admission through the Top Ten Percent Law as
opposed to the traditional application process.100 As a result of this
unique circumstance, the Court reasoned that even if the Top Ten
Percent Law increased minority enrollment as a matter of raw
numbers, such an “approach would sacrifice all other aspects of
diversity” as it would “exclude the star athlete or musician whose
grades suffered because of daily practices and training” or the
“talented young biologist who struggled to maintain above-average
grades in humanities classes.”101 Justice Kennedy reasoned that “class
rank is a single metric, and like any single metric, it will capture
certain types of people and miss others.”102 The Top Ten Percent Law
is fundamentally at odds with the goal of educational diversity as

95. Id. at 2213.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2209 (“The fact that this case has been litigated on a somewhat artificial basis,
furthermore, may limit its value for prospective guidance.”).
100. Id. at 2202.
101. Id. at 2213 (emphasis added).
102. Id.
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defined by past precedent.103 The Top Ten Percent Law created a
situation in which a majority of the University’s entering class was
essentially admitted based on a single metric (class rank) and thus
compromised the very diversity the University sought. This led to an
increased need for the University to be able to utilize its holistic
admissions policy to attain the diversity it sought in the remaining
25% of the class.
The narrow nature of the Court’s decision is further highlighted
by Justice Kennedy’s statement that “[t]he Court’s affirmance of the
University’s admissions policy today does not necessarily mean the
University may rely on that same policy without refinement.”104 In
holding that “[i]t is the University’s ongoing obligation to engage in
constant deliberation and continued reflection regarding its
admissions policies,”105 the Court indicates that the ruling regarding
the constitutionality of the University’s current admission policy itself
may turn out differently in the future should enrollment data and
statistics shift. This consideration denotes the volatility of the Court’s
own decision, highlighting the notion that even the same policy may
become unconstitutional as circumstances and data regarding students
change.
Moreover, under the University’s admissions policy race is
merely a “factor of a factor of a factor,” as it is one of many
considerations examined when assessing an applicant’s Personal
Achievement Index.106 Under the University’s admissions policy, the
consideration of race does not “operate as a mechanical plus factor for
underrepresented minorities.”107 Thus any university that considered
race as more than merely a factor of a factor in its admissions process
would likely face an uphill battle in meeting the narrow tailoring prong
of strict scrutiny.
Going forward, if a university wishes to use race as a factor in its
admissions process, it cannot rely on the general goal of merely
103. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003) (noting that admissions policies that
include percentage plans might preclude universities from “conducting the individualized
assessments necessary” to attain a truly diverse student body).
104. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2207 (“[A]lthough admissions officers can consider race as a positive feature of a
minority student’s application, there is no dispute that race is but a ‘factor of a factor of a factor’ in
the holistic-review calculus. Furthermore, consideration of race is contextual and does not operate
as a mechanical plus factor for underrepresented minorities.” (citation omitted)).
107. Id.
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increasing diversity, but rather, would likely need to prove a
deficiency in diversity and point to specific goals that courts have the
ability to measure.108
IV. CONCLUSION
Considering Justice Kennedy’s past stance on affirmative action
cases, it may be surprising to some that he decided in favor of
upholding a race-conscious admissions policy, and went on to author
the Court’s opinion. Prior to Fisher II, Justice Kennedy had never
voted to support an affirmative action policy.109 In fact, in Grutter,
Justice Kennedy wrote a scathing dissent that went so far as to state
that the majority’s acceptance of the University of Michigan Law
School’s admissions policies was “nothing short of perfunctory” and
that “the concept of critical mass” was a “delusion used by the Law
School to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most
instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from
quotas.”110
However, Justice Kennedy’s change in stance is an example of
the notion that as society evolves and circumstances change, so too
can the opinions of Supreme Court Justices. Should future challenges
to race-conscious university admissions policies arise, there may
easily be a new Justice on the Supreme Court whose outlook diverges
from that of the majority in Fisher II.
While the holding in Fisher II was groundbreaking in its own
right, the holding of the court is inextricable from the specific
circumstances and factors that played a role in the Court’s reasoning.
For this reason, the holding in Fisher II falls short of an unequivocal
upholding of the constitutionality of race-conscious university
admissions policies across the board. Fisher II leaves the door open to
new challenges, and possibly different outcomes, to race-conscious
university admissions policies moving forward.

108. Id. at 2211–12.
109. Daniel Fisher, Justice Kennedy Evolves from Affirmative Action Skeptic to Supporter with
Texas Case, FORBES (June 23, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2016/06/23/justice
-kennedy-evolves-from-affirmative-action-skeptic-to-supporter-with-texas-case/#45afa8af53ef
(“Kennedy’s opinion is all the more surprising since he had never before voted in favor of racebased preferences . . .”).
110. See Grutter, 539 U.S at 388–89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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